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Tractor Wars: Plowing Through Adversity
Kari Steen

Since the mid-1800s, companies have been developing and manufacturing
farm machinery to make life easier and more efficient for the world's farmers. One of the greatest innovations has been the development of the
tractor. Since its introduction, many advancements have been made by
companies striving to become the market leader.
J. I. CASE AND COMPANY

In 1863,Jerome I. Case started]. I. Case and Company with three young
executives. Case wanted to be a pioneer in a new country-the wheat country. This motive led him to manufacture threshing machines . His products
were honestly built with great concern for quality. Case refused to have his
name injured by a product that did not perform up to standards (Holbrook, 1976, p. 18) . In 1892, Case and Company manufactured the first
gasoline tractor (Holbrook, 1976, p. 105). Although this was an important
breakthrough, the tractor was immediately withdrawn because of problems
with its ignition and carbureting devices. Case efforts were then turned to
the steam engine.
The first truly successful gas traction engine was manufactured in 1903
by Hart Parr. Co . located in Charles City, Iowa. Hart Parr wanted a name for
its gasoline traction engine to distinguish it from the competing steam traction engines. This was how the word "tractor" came into being. It has now
been adopted as a generic term for all varieties of traction engines.
By 1907, Hart Parr was making one-third of all the gas traction engines
produced in the United States. However, these tractors were extremely heavy
and difficult to drive. Maintenance was also a problem since few duplicate parts
were made (Holbrook, 1976, p . 168) . Hart Parr was unable to overcome these
problems and later became part of the Oliver Corporation.
Finally, in 191.1, Case felt it had a gas tractor good enough to market:
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th e Case 30-60. In 1912 it introduced a new lighte r m o del, the Case 20-40,
and in 191 3, an e ven lighte r mod e l, th e 12-25. Case suppl e mented its n ew
lin e of tracto rs with tractor schools. Th e company was the first in the industry to hold classes which educate d farmers in ignition and ca rbure tion
(Holbrook , 1976, p. 170).
CASE GETS IN OVER ITS HEAD

Agricultural e quipment firms started to develop into full-line companies,
making everything in the way of farm machin e ry and tools, during the early
1900s. Inte rn a tional Harve ster, formed in 1902 by a merger of several companies, was th e first to becom e a full-lin e company (Holbrook, 1976, p.
187).J. I. Case joined the full-line trend in 1928. In 1953, see king to
improve its market share, Case introduced a new diesel tractor-the first
ever to have power steering (Holbrook, 1976, p. 244). Case's line also
included machin es that could handle more cr o p varietie s a nd increased
acreage at faste r speeds . In 1957, Case deve loped the Case-O-Matic transmission for its n ew agricultural tractor line. When probl e ms developed and
tractor production had to be held up, Case 's response was to e xpand other
operations. It expanded its line of construction equipment to cover operating losses on the agricultural lin e . However, problems also d eveloped in
one of Case 's construction lin e s which placed Case in further financial difficulty. Case had attempted to do "too much too quickly" (Holbrook, 1976).
Case 's financial situation had greatly improved by the mid-1960s when it
introduced the first four-wh ee l drive, four-whe e l steer tractor to be mass
produced (Holbrook, 1976) . Following this new development, Case was
acquired by Te nneco Inc. in 1967. Tenneco d ecided Case would stop making the one piece of equipment it was originally known for, the harvesting
machine. In 1968, Tenneco turned Case's construction busin ess into a separate division and, in 1969, unveiled the first completely new line of
agricultural tractors in 10 years. This new line was an immediate success
(Holbrook, 1976, p . 260) . It had new features such as fully e nclosed cabs ,
heaters, air conditioners, and AM / FM radios.
JOHN DEERE AND COMPANY

Unlike]. I. Case, which starte d out manufacturing threshers, Deere and Co.
started in th e plow industry. Two other important differences between the
compani es also favored Dee re. These were De ere's keen se nse of advertising and pub lic relations, and its longtime involvement in agricultural fairs
(Broehl, 1984).
Headquarte re d in Moline, Illinois, in 1869, Deere se t up a separate
bra nch house in Kansas City. It e stablish e d four more sales branches
34
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between 1869 and 1889. These five individual branches took directions
from the Moline headquarters; however, they were also individual businesses taking an additional set of orders from a local manager. This sales
strategy would prove highly successful.
When International Harvester came into being in 1902, it did not pose
much of a threat to either Deere or Case since its main product was harvesters.
However, as the demand for harvesters started to fall, International Harvester
became a greater challenge to Deere by moving into product lines that competed head-on with Deere's products (Broe hi, 1984, p. 299). In fact, International
Harvester was the leader in tractor manufacturing by 1911.J. I. Case was also a
major competitor in tractor production. Deere, on the other hand, did not
even launch its first tractor strategy until 1912. It built only one model, and its
efficiency was disappointing in field trials (Broehl, 1984, p. 359). By 1914, all
further work on this Deere tractor was stopped.
DEERE "BUYS" ITS FIRST SUCCESSFUL TRACTOR

Deere once again entered the tractor market in 1918 with the purchase of
the Waterloo Gasoline Engine Company in Iowa which manufactured the
Waterloo Boy. The Waterloo Boy was known as "the original kerosene tractor" (Huber and Hughes, 1988, p. 8). Deere thus bought its first successful
tractor. The decline of the Waterloo Boy came after World War I and was
offset by the first commercially viable Deere-made tractor, the Model D,
which was introduced around 1922. The development of the Model D took
into consideration the safety, comfort, and convenience of the operator. It
was the first John Deere tractor to be produced in substantial quantity and
remained in the line 30 years longer than any other Deere tractor (Huber
and Hughes, 1988, p. 19). The John Deere General Purpose tractor did not
replace the Model D; it simply provided farmers with greater versatility.
First marketed in 1928, it was designed to accommodate integrally mounted
equipment and was copied by many of John Deere's competitors (Huber
and Hughes, 1988).
DEERE DISTRIBUTION DOMINATES

A major shift in market positions occurred during the 1920s. Full-line companies were picking up increasing percentages of the market. This put
Deere and International Harvester in the two most dominating positions.
These two companies controlled the market through their distribution centers (Broehl, 1984, p. 490). They possessed great strength in their branch
houses and dealer organizations, enabling them to develop strong relationships with both dealers and farmers. These companies could also take
advantage of lower selling costs through economies of scale (Broehl, 1984).
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Deere had an additional a dvantage in that it had always been attuned to
the needs of the farmers and was able to instill this attribute in its dealers.
According to historian Wayne Broe hi, "It was the farmer who would be the
ultimate arbiter of success for the company" (1984, p. 490). Deere also
exhibited its customer concern through advertising and by promoting quality products. Sales forces in both the branch offices and dealerships were
knowledgeable about its products and dedicated to a close relationship with
the farmer. By the end of the 1920s, Deere emerged as the leader.
During the 1950s, innovation in tractors centered on increased horsepower. This encouraged Deere to move from the two-cylinder to a
four-cylinder tractor. Deere's 40-50-60-70-80 models were upgraded to the
20 series. Along with increased horsepower, refinements were made in
hydraulics, the fuel system, and engine design. This allowed several models
to establish new fuel economy records (Broehl, 1984, p. 642) . Operator
comfort, convenience, and styling were also improved.
The number of farm tractors in the United States peaked at 4,787,000 in
1965 and fell to 4,324,000 in 1980 (Broehl, 1984, p . 735). The trend in the
country was towards fewer but larger tractors with higher horsepower.
Deere responded to this demand by introducing seven additional tractor
sizes, all above 100 horsepower. Deere's Generation II tractors, also known
as the 30 series, were introduced in 1972 and strengthened the company's
position in medium sized row-crop tractors. The 40 series in 1977 strengthened Deere's position even more . By 1981, Deere held a 45 percent share of
the U.S. row-crop tractor market (Broehl, 1984, p. 736).
The "icing on the cake" came in 1982 with the new 50 series. This series
provided the link between innovation and new field demands . The benefits
of this new series included increased horsepower, mechanical front-wheel
drive, a new 15-speed power shift transmission, and the new caster/action
which shortened the tractor's turning radius.
HIGH REPUTATION IN CONSUMER'S MIND

By 1982, Deere had established an impressive reputation . The New York
Times stated that : The truly great American companies, those most respected and effective offshore as competitors, are not players of funny money
games. Rather, enterprises like Caterpiller,John Deere, Procter and Gamble, and Eastman Kodak single-mindedly dedicate themselves to deepening
their product lines, improving their product delivery and support systems,
manufacturing more efficiently, and adapting to evolving world market conditions. (Broehl, 1984, p . 775) Other well-known publications commended
Deere for always looking towards the future (Broehl, 1984, p. 775) .
Deere's dealer organization has truly been one of its major strengths. It sur36
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vived the recession of the early 1980s and emerged even stronger (Broehl,
1984). A final advantage Deere has enjoyed throughout the century has been
the financial situation of its competitors. Like Tenneco's Case which overextended in the 1960s, many of Deere's competitors experienced financial troubles which prevented them from competing head-on with Deere.
CASE BUYS INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER

By the 1980s, Case had fallen behind both Deere and International Harvester
in the farm equipment market. Deere and Company was the market leader in
the farm equipment industry with a 42 percent market share. International
Harvester was second with 18 percent, and Case third with 16 percent (Reiff,
1989, p. 27). This left 24 percent to be divided among a few low-volume competitors such as Massy-Ferguson, Duetz-Allis, and White-New Idea. In 1985,
Case bought out International Harvester and poured $1 billion into making].
I. Case a strong number two to Deere with 37 percent market share (Reiff,
1989, p. 27). Case would not be doing as well as it is today without the purchase
oflnternational Harvester. Case acquired Harvester's assets at a low cost. Harvester also gave Case the sales volume and economies of scale it needed to modernize plants and develop new products. However, the most important benefit
from the acquisition was the strong runner-up position Case gained in the farm
equipment oligopoly. In 1986, Deere and Case combined dominated threefourths of the market in big two-wheel drive tractors. This posed a serious
threat to the low-volume competitors.
PROBLEMS STILL REMAINED

Case-IH still had some problems that needed solving, however. Costs needed to
be cut, and there was still a significant quality gap between Deere and Case-IH.
J. I. Case Chief Executive James Ashford stated that his objective was to "produce such a quality product that customers and dealers won't flinch when
[Case] raises prices on new models or refuses to sell [its] machines for less than
the comparable John Deere models" (Reiff, 1989, p. 27).
Case-IH is Deere's strongest and, in point of fact, only competitor. As
noted earlier, the other companies in the agricultural tractor market are
small and of little threat to the two "giants," especially Deere. These small
competitors now include Fiat-Ford-New-Holland-Hesston, as well as DuetzAllis and White-New Idea (Schroeder, 1992). A major concern, especially to
Case-lH, may be foreign competitors. N.H. Geotech dominates the European market, controlling double the share of its nearest competitor
( Waterloo Weekly News, 1992). Another foreign competitor that may have
some impact is Sarne from Italy.
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PAST STRATEGIES FOR WAR
It is hard to determine what type of strategy each company was taking in the
earliest years of the tractor industry. Almost all seemed to be pursuing a
defensive strategy. Everyone was coming out with new innovations. Once
these were incorporated into a new tractor line, the old line was phased
out. No one seemed to be focusing on a specific niche; nevertheless, some
successful strategies were implemented.
Hart Parr Co. used a flanking attack with its 1903 introduction of the first
gasoline traction engine. Although this attack led to the development of the
generic term "tractor," the engine itself was widely copied by other companies
and, as a result, was unable to advance Hart Parr very far in the market.
Once International Harvester took the lead in the tractor induscry
around 1911, Case took a long time to develop offensive strategies. It was
not until 1953 that Case introduced its new diesel tractor with power steering. Case also tried to attack International Harvester head-on in the
mid-l 960s when it developed the first four-wheel drive, four-wheel steer
tractor to be massed produced. These two attacks slightly improved Case's
market share. However, they were not enough for Case to take over the
leading position held then by International Harvester.
Deere began in a bad position. It did not get into the tractor market
until the other companies had established their names and products. Once
the full-line companies came into power, however, Deere was able to move
ahead. Deere used a flanking strategy with its unique distribution system
and branch houses which eventually enabled it to pass Case and International Harvester. Deere's focus on quality, inventory control, and the
consumer also helped it to become the leader in the industry in the past
few decades.
STRATEGIES TODAY
Deere focuses on the high price niche which helps it keep its number one
position. Deere equipment may cost a little more, but many consumers feel
the quality that goes into a Deere is worth the cost. Case-IH is never going
to succeed if it tries to sell its equipment at the same price as Deere's.
Deere already holds this position in the consumer's mind. Case-IH needs to
focus on some other offensive attack.
The defensive strategy taken by Deere is a successful one. Deere is good
at phasing out old models and replacing them with new advancements and
new models. Many tractors of a Deere series may look similar, but they are
different in significant ways. The only real problem Deere faces now is its
capacity. When the market for farm equipment started to rise after the
recession in the early 1980s, Deere assumed it would continue to do so.
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Therefore, it built the enormous Waterloo Works to increase output to 200
tractors per day. Soon after, production dropped to 30 tractors per day. Now
this plant only produces about 70 tractors per day, yet Deere is still paying
for all the fixed costs (Schroeder, 1992). To overcome this problem, Deere
has used the empty space in the facility to make parts for other companies .
This was never very profitable and is no longer done (Schroeder, 1992) .
Instead of making parts for other companies , Deere may be able to lease its
excess capacity to companies in order to help pay for fixed costs. Today,
however, excess capacity still remains a serious problem.
The other companies in the industry are having a tough time trying to
catch Deere. These companies have been combining forces for years hoping to become big enough to compete. By merging, these companies
attempted to increase their market share; however, they have not been successful in catching Deere (Schroeder, 1992).
Deere, on the other hand, is the only company that has not merged with
anyone. This may be the result of a strategy that contradicts some of Ries
and Trout's beliefs. Deere competes in a variety of markets including heavy
industrial equipment, lawn and garden equipment , and agricultural equipment. Its credit company is also profitable, as are its insurance and health
care programs (Schroeder, 1992). This diversity allows Deere to support its
poor performing divisions with the profits from other divisions. If tractors
had stayed the strong market they once were, this diversity may have actually hurt Deere. The company would not have been able to invest enough
into its tractor division to keep it going strong. Instead, Deere would have
had to support other divisions. However, since the tractor market has greatly slowed down, this strategy actually is helping Deere stay on top.
Deere has created a good name and position for itself in the agricultural
industry. Considering Deere's strength in this market, it is going to be
tough for any rival to catch up. The only real competitor Deere has is CaselH. However, in order for Case-IH to threaten Deere it must start following
an offensive strategy. Case-IH needs to find a weakness in the leader's
strength and mass its forces to attack this weakness (Ries and Trout, 1986).
This weakness may be the diversity that originally took Deere to the top.
Case-IH could become a specialist in one type of farm machinery, instead of
producing everything, and become the market leader in that one piece of
equipment. This would cause Deere's market share to drop slightly. If CaselH is successful in this strategy, it may be able to gain on Deere; however, it
is unlikely to surpass the mighty leader.
It is going to be almost impossible for any of the smaller companies to
catch Deere. Even catching up with Case-IH is going to take more resources
than many of these companies have to spend. The smaller companies such
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as Fiat-Ford-New Holland-Hesston, Duetz-Allis, and White-New Idea should
follow a flanking or guerilla warfare strategy. Both these strategies require a
narrow focus with concentrated forces. Market segments should be small
enough to defend and chosen niches should be uncontested (Ries and
Trout, 1986). These strategies would allow smaller companies to become
the leader of a small segment of the tractor industry, or to dominate a specific niche. Since Deere already holds the high-price niche, a smaller
company could focus on a low-price niche or a specific geographic area.
CONCLUSION

Deere and Company is a highly respected, well organized company that is
going to be hard to beat. It climbed to the top by contradicting Ries and
Trout and diversifying into many different products. However, Deere and
Company now practices a strong defensive strategy which has been successful in fighting off the competition. Even with the acquisition of
International Harvester, Case-IH is going to have to come up with a much
better offensive strategy than it has to date to take the top position away
from Deere. Ironically, this offensive strategy may include attacking the
diversity philosophy that originally made Deere the market leader. Even
though Deere and Case dominate this industry, there is still room for the
smaller companies. These companies should not try to get larger in order
to compete with Deere or Case, but should find their own niches and strive
to become the leader of those niches-not of the whole industry. Although
Deere is clearly the leader in the tractor industry, the other companies can
also have a profitable future if they use the correct marketing warfare.
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